What Was the Russian Empire’s Role in the Napoleonic Wars?
The Russian Empire played a central role in the Napoleonic Wars, the series of military conflicts between Napoleonic France and the various European great powers that lasted from 1803 to 1815. Russia was the principal continental opponent of France, and the Russian military effort of 1812-1814 was the central fact of Napoleon’s defeat. The Russian Empire’s diplomatic influence at the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815 was, in turn, the basis of the post-Napoleonic European order that lasted until 1853. The Napoleonic Wars, in this sense, were the central event of the early nineteenth-century Russian Empire, and the campaigns of 1812-1814 are the foundation of the modern Russian national memory (see Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 2009).
Russia and the early coalitions
Russia entered the Napoleonic Wars as a member of the Third Coalition against France in 1805. The Russian army, commanded by General Mikhail Kutuzov, joined the Austro-Russian forces in the campaign of 1805. The Russian forces, however, were not yet accustomed to the new style of warfare that Napoleon had introduced, and the Austro-Russian defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805 was an important Russian setback. The Russian army, in 1805, had been drawn into a position of which the French Emperor could take advantage; the Russian commanders had not.
The campaign of 1806-1807 was equally difficult. The Russian forces, in the campaign of 1806-1807, fought Napoleon and the French army in the battles of Eylau (8 February 1807) and Friedland (14 June 1807), and the Russian army suffered a major defeat at Friedland. The Russian forces lost about 20,000 men in a single afternoon, and the Russian government was forced to negotiate a peace. The peace, the Treaty of Tilsit of 7 July 1807, was the most humiliating Russian diplomatic defeat of the period (Zamoyski, 1812, 2007).
The campaign of 1812
The campaign of 1812 was the central event of the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon gathered the Grande Armée — at over 600,000 men the largest European army ever assembled — and led it across the Neman River on 24 June 1812. The Russian strategy, developed by the war minister Michael Barclay de Tolly, was a strategy of strategic retreat: the Russian army refused Napoleon the decisive battle he sought and instead withdrew, drawing the French army further from its bases. As they fell back, Russian troops and civilians burned crops, emptied storehouses, and destroyed anything that might feed the Grande Armée.
The strategy was deeply controversial in Russia. Barclay de Tolly was accused of cowardice, and the public and the army demanded a stand against the invader. The command was given to the elderly Kutuzov in August 1812, with the agreement that the army would make a stand before Moscow. The stand was made at Borodino on 7 September 1812 (26 August old style). The battle was an engagement, with combined French and Russian artillery of about 1,200 pieces, and casualties of about 30,000 French and 45,000 Russian. Tactically the result was indecisive, but strategically the battle confirmed that Napoleon could not pin down and destroy the Russian army (Zamoyski, 2007).
The destruction of the Grande Armée
The destruction of the Grande Armée was the consequence of the Russian strategy, the Russian winter, and the French logistical failure. When Napoleon entered Moscow on 14 September 1812, the Russian army was intact, the Russian government had refused to negotiate, and the French army was far from its bases. The fires that broke out in Moscow shortly after the French occupation destroyed much of the city and undermined French morale. Napoleon ordered the withdrawal in October, and the retreat of the Grande Armée ranks among the worst military catastrophes ever recorded: of the more than 600,000 men who had crossed the Neman in June, fewer than 100,000 recrossed it in December (Zamoyski, 2007).
The campaigns of 1813-1814
The campaigns of 1813-1814 were the European consequence of the Russian victory of 1812. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain joined forces against Napoleon in the spring of 1813. The Russian army, commanded by Kutuzov until his death in April 1813, was the principal allied force in the spring campaign. The Russian forces were led, after Kutuzov’s death, by Wittgenstein, Barclay de Tolly, and Bennigsen, under the overall direction of Alexander I. The Battle of Leipzig on 16-19 October 1813, the largest battle of the Napoleonic Wars, was a major allied victory; the allies then invaded France, and the Russian army entered Paris on 31 March 1814.
Napoleon abdicated on 11 April 1814 and was exiled to the island of Elba. The allies restored the Bourbon monarchy in France and the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe. Alexander I played a central role at the Congress, and the Russian position in the new European system was significantly strengthened. The 1815 settlement — the Holy Alliance of 26 September 1815, the Quadruple Alliance of 20 November 1815, and the various other agreements — was the basis of the post-Napoleonic European order that lasted until the Crimean War (Lieven, 2009).
The Hundred Days and the end of the wars
The Napoleonic Wars had one final chapter, the Hundred Days of 1815. Napoleon escaped from Elba in March 1815, reclaimed power in France, and was defeated at Waterloo on 18 June 1815. The Russian government, which had been in the process of winding down the post-Vienna settlement, joined the other allied powers in declaring war on the returned emperor and mobilising against him. A Russian army of 200,000 men was set out to take part in the fighting; the campaign was over before it arrived.
The Napoleonic Wars, accordingly, closed with the Congress of Vienna and the restoration of the European order. The Russian role in the wars — the 1812 campaign, the European campaigns of 1813-1814, and the diplomatic leadership of the post-Vienna settlement — was the basis of the Russian imperial position in the European state system for the next forty years. The Russian army’s victory in 1812-1814 is, accordingly, the central event of the early nineteenth-century Russian Empire, and the 1812 campaign is the foundation of the modern Russian national memory (Lieven, 2009).