What Was the Russo-Japanese War?
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a military conflict between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan, fought over the control of Manchuria and Korea. The war began on the night of 8 February 1904, when the Japanese navy launched a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur, and it ended on 5 September 1905 with the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under the mediation of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. The war was the first military defeat of a European power by an Asian power in modern history, and it was a turning point in the history of both empires. The Russian defeat, in particular, was an important factor in the 1905 Revolution (see Steinberg, Russia at the Crossroads, 1995).
The causes
The war had its roots in the Russian advance in East Asia in the 1890s. The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the establishment of the Russian naval base at Port Arthur, and the development of Russian economic interests in Manchuria gave Russia a substantial position in the region. The Russian position was codified in the 1896 treaty with China, which gave Russia the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway through Manchuria, and the 1898 lease of Port Arthur and the Liaodong peninsula. Japan, which had been developing its own imperial position in East Asia, watched the Russian advance with growing concern.
The Japanese government, led by the genro Itō Hirobumi, decided to act. Japan had been building up its navy and its army since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and the Japanese government was confident that it could defeat Russia in a quick war. The Russian government, in contrast, was divided: some ministers, including the minister of war, General Aleksey Kuropatkin, and the chief of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov, thought the Russian position was strong; others, including the minister of finance, Sergei Witte, thought that Russia should negotiate. The decision to reject the Japanese demands in the negotiations of 1903 was a diplomatic miscalculation (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun, 2001).
The course of the war
The war was fought on three fronts. The most important was the Manchurian land campaign, in which the Japanese forces — under Marshal Iwao Ōyama, with the chief of staff Kodama Gentarō — fought the Russian Far Eastern forces under General Aleksey Kuropatkin. The Japanese forces landed at Chemulpo (Inchon) in February 1904, took the key position at the Yalu River in May 1904, took Port Arthur on 2 January 1905 after a long siege, and won the decisive land battle at Mukden on 21 February - 10 March 1905.
The second front was the Pacific naval campaign. The Russian Pacific Fleet, bottled up at Port Arthur by the Japanese navy, was unable to break out. The Russian Baltic Fleet, which had been sent halfway around the world to challenge the Japanese, was destroyed at the Battle of Tsushima on 27-28 May 1905, in one of the most decisive naval battles in history. The Russian navy lost 21 of its 34 ships, and 5,045 Russian sailors were killed or captured. The Russian Baltic Fleet had been 18 months at sea when it arrived, and it was effectively destroyed as a fighting force (Steinberg, 1995).
The Treaty of Portsmouth
The Russian government, recognising the military situation, agreed to negotiate. The negotiations were conducted at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905, under the mediation of Theodore Roosevelt. The Russian delegation, led by Sergei Witte, and the Japanese delegation, led by the foreign minister Komura Jutarō, signed the treaty on 5 September 1905. The terms were harsh: Russia recognised Japanese predominance in Korea, ceded the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, evacuated Manchuria, and made no payment of indemnity. The Japanese demand for a Russian indemnity of 1.5 billion rubles was the most difficult part of the negotiations; Witte eventually obtained a compromise in which Russia paid no indemnity but ceded Sakhalin.
The treaty was a humiliation for Russia, and it was widely criticised in Russia as a betrayal of Russian interests. Sergei Witte, who had been the chief Russian negotiator, was received by the emperor but the treaty was condemned in the Russian press; Witte was shot in the face by a right-wing assassin in June 1906 and barely survived. The treaty was, however, accepted by the Russian government and was the basis of the post-war Russo-Japanese relationship (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2001).
The impact of the war
The Russo-Japanese War had an impact on Russia. The defeat at Tsushima and the fall of Port Arthur, announced in January 1905, were the immediate triggers of the Bloody Sunday march of 9 January 1905, which was itself the immediate trigger of the 1905 Revolution. The war also had an impact on the Russian military: the Russian army’s poor performance in 1904-1905 was the basis of the post-1905 military reforms, including the establishment of the General Staff, the reorganisation of the army on a divisional basis, and the expansion of the Russian officer corps.
The war had a comparable impact on Japan. The victory established Japan as a major power in East Asia, and it was the first major victory of an Asian power over a European power in modern history. The war contributed to the development of Japanese nationalism, and it marked the beginning of a new era in Japanese foreign policy. The war also had an impact on the international system: the defeat of Russia shifted the balance of power in East Asia, and it contributed to the development of a new era of imperialism in the region. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the increasing involvement of the United States in East Asian diplomacy were all consequences of the war (Steinberg, 1995).