Question & Answer

What Was the November Uprising of 1830?

The November Uprising began on the night of 29 November 1830, when a detachment of Polish military cadets of the Warsaw Officers’ School attacked the Belweder Palace, the residence of the Russian-controlled Polish viceroy. The attack was led by the cadet Piotr Wysocki and a small group of conspirators; it triggered a five-month armed rising, the first of the great Polish uprisings of the nineteenth century, and it opened the long period of Russian-Polish confrontation that would last until 1918. The uprising ended with the fall of Warsaw to the Russian army on 8 September 1831, after which the Russian government abolished the Constitution of 1815 and reimposed direct rule (see Wereszycki, Kongres Wiedeński, 1955).

The Polish-Russian context

The Kingdom of Poland, in personal union with the Russian Empire, had been given a constitution by Alexander I in 1815. The constitution provided for a separate Polish government, a separate Polish army, a separate Polish educational system, and a Diet that would meet every two years. The Kingdom’s viceroy, in 1830, was the Polish general Józef Zajączek, but the real power lay with the Russian-controlled army, the Russian financial oversight, and the Russian-controlled University of Warsaw. Tsar Nicholas I, who had come to the throne in December 1825, was a convinced reactionary, and his reign inaugurated a period of Russian tightening on the Kingdom.

The Polish officers of the Congress Kingdom’s army were the most immediately restive class. They had served in the Napoleonic campaigns of 1812-1814, many of them in the Vistula Legion, and they had returned to a Kingdom that was politically subordinate to Russia. The cadet conspiracy that produced the November attack was, in the first instance, a military conspiracy. The civilian liberal opposition in Warsaw — the Patriotic Society, the Patriotic Club, and the various others — provided the political framing for the uprising, but the actual trigger was the cadet action (Wereszycki, 1955).

The campaign

The Polish forces numbered about 80,000 men at the outset. The Russian forces in the Kingdom, under Field Marshal Hans von Diebitsch, numbered about 240,000. The Polish strategy was to defend the Kingdom’s borders and to seek international recognition; the Russian strategy was to invade the Kingdom, isolate Warsaw, and force a decisive battle. The campaign’s two decisive actions were the Battle of Grochów (19/25 February 1831), a Polish defensive success that stopped the Russian advance, and the Battle of Ostrołęka (14/26 May 1831), a Russian victory that turned the campaign. After Ostrołęka, the Polish army was forced into a series of retreats, and the fall of Warsaw on 8 September 1831 was the final action.

The Russian government, after the fall of Warsaw, abolished the Constitution of 1815. The Polish army was disbanded, the Sejm was suspended, the universities of Warsaw and Vilna were closed, and the Kingdom was reduced to a Russian province. About 30,000 Polish soldiers and civilians fled to the West in the “Great Emigration” that would, over the next decades, become the centre of Polish national life. The Cadet Cabinet that had been established in Warsaw in December 1830, and the National Government that succeeded it, was replaced by a Russian military administration under Ivan Paskevich (Leslie, The History of Poland since 1863, 1980).

The émigré and cultural legacy

The November Uprising and the Great Emigration that followed had an outsize cultural effect. The émigré community in Paris, Brussels, and London became the centre of Polish national life; Adam Czartoryski, the former Russian foreign minister, was the political centre; the poet Adam Mickiewicz, in exile in Paris, wrote Pan Tadeusz (1834) and the Forefathers’ Eve cycle. The political programme of the émigré community — the Hotel Lambert under Czartoryski, the Polish Democratic Society under Tadeusz Krępowiecki — defined the Polish national programme for the next half-century.

The November Uprising also produced the post-1831 generation of Polish romantic writers and painters. Stanisław Wyspiański’s play Noc listopadowa (1904) treated the uprising as a national parable; the painters Artur Grottger and Wojciech Kossak devoted major cycles to the 1830 and 1863 uprisings. The November Uprising entered Polish literature as a foundational national event, and it remains a touchstone of Polish national memory (Walicki, Russia, Poland, and the West, 2011).

The Russian consequences

The Russian consequences were equally serious. The 1830 uprising was the first major test of the post-Congress European system, and the Russian response was the model for the next generation of conservative Russian action. Nicholas I appointed Ivan Paskevich, the conqueror of Warsaw, as the new viceroy of Poland and gave him wide powers. The Russian government also used the uprising to justify a more general tightening of the censorship regime, including the Second Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery, the famous “Third Section,” founded on 3 July 1826, which was the centre of Nicholas’s political police until 1880. The November Uprising, in this sense, was the event that set the Russian autocratic style of the next thirty years (Raeff, Michael Speransky, 1957).